Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice¶
Schelling, T. C. (1984). Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice. American Economic Review, 74(2), 1-11.
Retired. This is not a bibliographic entry. Our extractor captured an inline prose definition from an article and stored it as a work. The concept is real; this registry record is a parsing defect. This entry is kept so the citations that pointed at it still resolve, and so the correction is visible rather than silent.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Commitment Device
- Its strength is that it settles the decision in a cool state and lets that decision stand when you are hot, tired, or tempted — neutralizing the willpower gap against exactly the predictable, recurring pulls that repeated resolve keeps losing to.
This sourceAnalyzes self-command as making advance commitments in a cooler state that constrain predictable later temptation and recurring failures of resolve.
- Its strength is that it settles the decision in a cool state and lets that decision stand when you are hot, tired, or tempted — neutralizing the willpower gap against exactly the predictable, recurring pulls that repeated resolve keeps losing to.
- Precommitment Contract
- This is the Ulysses contract: binding yourself in advance because you rightly expect your future preferences to be worse informed or worse aligned than your present ones.
This sourceAnalyzes self-command as present choices that constrain later action when a person anticipates conflicting future preferences.
- This is the Ulysses contract: binding yourself in advance because you rightly expect your future preferences to be worse informed or worse aligned than your present ones.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Not checked yet. This entry carries no identifier to resolve. It was extracted from the citation as written in the article, normalized, and deduplicated against the rest of the registry.
Does it back the claim? Not recorded. Neither this nor any other of the 2 citations of this work carries a recorded support check.
Was it audited? Yes. A second, independent pass read the citation against the article text and recorded a verdict.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 2 other ways.
- https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:74:y:1984:i:2:p:1-11 ×1
- https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a74_3ay_3a1984_3ai_3a2_3ap_3a1-11.htm ×1
Registry ID ref:26cf9bb3ea61 · see in the full table