A Theory of the Calculus of Voting¶
Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. American Political Science Review, 25-42.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Paradox of Voting (Downs Paradox)
- The literature's response is a menu of mechanism-restoring patches that each add terms outside the bare pB − C calculus: Riker and Ordeshook's D-term, a direct expressive or civic-duty benefit from the act of voting independent of its decisiveness; Schuessler's expressive-identification account, in which voting affirms group membership rather than influencing outcomes; Ferejohn and Fiorina's minimax-regret reasoning, which avoids the expected-utility frame entirely; Brennan and Lomasky's ethical-voter preferences; and Gerber, Green, and Larimer's social-pressure account, supported by field experiments in which mailers signaling that a household's turnout would be publicly observable increased turnout by roughly eight percentage points — a magnitude unexplained by the instrumental calculus but consistent with social-sanction terms added to the utility function
This sourceRiker and Ordeshook's formal calculus of voting, which added the decisiveness-independent D-term - civic duty or expressive benefit - to the instrumental pB - C expression; the other four patches named in this sentence are separate works.
Supported in partVerified against the source
- The literature's response is a menu of mechanism-restoring patches that each add terms outside the bare pB − C calculus: Riker and Ordeshook's D-term, a direct expressive or civic-duty benefit from the act of voting independent of its decisiveness; Schuessler's expressive-identification account, in which voting affirms group membership rather than influencing outcomes; Ferejohn and Fiorina's minimax-regret reasoning, which avoids the expected-utility frame entirely; Brennan and Lomasky's ethical-voter preferences; and Gerber, Green, and Larimer's social-pressure account, supported by field experiments in which mailers signaling that a household's turnout would be publicly observable increased turnout by roughly eight percentage points — a magnitude unexplained by the instrumental calculus but consistent with social-sanction terms added to the utility function
- Rational Choice Model
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