On the concept of logical consequence¶
Tarski, A. (1956). On the concept of logical consequence. Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.
Cited by¶
4 citations across 4 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Deductive Reasoning
- ) or model-theoretically (as semantic entailment, where a conclusion holds in all models satisfying the premises — Tarskian semantics
This sourceGives the model-theoretic (Tarskian) account: X is a logical consequence of Γ iff every model of Γ is a model of X. WebSearch confirmed Tarski's 1936 definition of logical consequence as truth-in-every-model.
- ) or model-theoretically (as semantic entailment, where a conclusion holds in all models satisfying the premises — Tarskian semantics
- Dependency
- Meta-Symbolic Reflection
- The meta-level may be formally distinct (Tarski's metalanguage hierarchy, 1936
This sourceFoundational model-theoretic account of logical consequence (entailment); makes the dependency of a conclusion on its premises precise in terms of truth-preservation across all models.
- The meta-level may be formally distinct (Tarski's metalanguage hierarchy, 1936
- Reflexivity (Self-Reference)
- Logic and mathematics: Russell's paradox (a set of all sets not containing themselves—contradictory under unrestricted comprehension); Gödel's incompleteness theorems (mathematical theories sufficient to express self-reference cannot prove their own consistency); Tarski's undefinability theorem (truth cannot be defined within the language it applies to)
This sourceFoundational model-theoretic account of logical consequence (entailment); makes the dependency of a conclusion on its premises precise in terms of truth-preservation across all models.
- Logic and mathematics: Russell's paradox (a set of all sets not containing themselves—contradictory under unrestricted comprehension); Gödel's incompleteness theorems (mathematical theories sufficient to express self-reference cannot prove their own consistency); Tarski's undefinability theorem (truth cannot be defined within the language it applies to)
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