Transaction-cost economics

Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233-261.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1979

Link

https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/jle/vol22/iss2/3/

Cited from

economics_finance, law_governance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Governance
  • Governance codifies these relationships so individuals can act without constant referral upward and without fear of arbitrary reversal, the transaction-cost reduction that Williamson (1979) identifies as the core economic function of governance structures.

    This sourceFoundational transaction-cost analysis showing that governance structures economize on negotiation and dispute-resolution costs, enabling parties to act without constant renegotiation—the transaction-cost reduction the prime attributes to governance.

• Transaction Costs
  • … negotiation); ex-post transaction costs (monitoring, enforcement, renegotiation, adjustment); market transaction costs (between arm's-length parties); hierarchical transaction costs (within firms — agency costs, bureaucratic costs, internal measurement-and-reward costs); political transaction costs (

    This sourceFoundational transaction-cost analysis showing that governance structures economize on negotiation and dispute-resolution costs, enabling action without constant renegotiation.

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