Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior

Gilboa, & Schmeidler. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1989

ISSN

0304-4068

DOI

10.1016/0304-4068(89)90018-9

DOI registrant

Elsevier

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(89)90018-9

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Ambiguity Aversion
  • Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) characterised maxmin expected utility — the decision rule that evaluates each act by its expected utility under the worst-case prior in a set — as the formal model that both rationalises ambiguity aversion and satisfies a weakened version of Savage's axioms.

    This sourceThe maxmin expected utility representation theorem attributed in this sentence.

• Ellsberg Paradox
  • This finding showed that the preferences cannot be reconciled with any single first-order subjective probability over the ambiguous urn, and launched the formal research programme on non-additive probabilities and multiple-priors models — Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler, 1989), maxmin expected utility over a set of priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), and subsequent smooth-ambiguity and variational-preferences frameworks — each designed to accommodate the Ellsberg pattern within a utility-maximisation structure that Savage's axioms cannot accommodate.

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