The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation.

Peltzman, S. (1975). The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 83(4), 677-725.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1975

DOI

10.1086/260352

Link

https://doi.org/10.1086/260352

Cited from

economics_finance, systems_cybernetics

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Anticipatory Neutralization
  • Beyond macroeconomics, the Peltzman effect (risk compensation) describes drivers anticipating new safety equipment and re-optimising toward more aggressive driving; vaccine policy sees analogous exposure-behaviour increases.

    This sourceThe Peltzman effect (risk compensation): drivers re-optimize toward more aggressive driving under mandated safety equipment, partially offsetting the engineered injury reduction.

• Jevons Paradox
  • Not `peltzman_effect` (risk compensation) per se. Risk compensation is a behavioural cousin where a safety gain elicits offsetting risk-taking; it shares the rebound skeleton but is a narrower, behaviour-specific instance, whereas Jevons spans any "price" currency (money, time, attention).

    This sourceOriginal statement of risk compensation (the Peltzman effect): a safety gain elicits offsetting risk-taking, a behavior-specific cousin of the rebound dynamic.

• Peltzman Effect
  • This is the general pattern usually labelled risk compensation or behavioral offset, of which the Peltzman effect — the finding that mandatory car-safety equipment increased risky driving and shifted some of the saved driver-deaths into pedestrian and cyclist deaths — is the canonical economic instantiation.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:294e9be4eace · see in the full table