Designing Economic Mechanisms

Hurwicz, L., & Reiter, S. (2006). Designing Economic Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2006

Link

https://www.cambridge.org/9780521836418

Cited from

information_theory, operations_research

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Allocation
  • The structural insight is robust: an OS scheduler, an ICU triage protocol, a portfolio rebalance, a forest tree apportioning photosynthate, and a spectrum auction all exhibit the same role-vocabulary, a cross-substrate recurrence Hurwicz and Reiter (2006) trace through their general theory of resource-allocation mechanisms across markets and central planners alike.

    This sourceSystematic theory of resource-allocation mechanisms — institutions through which economic activity is coordinated — spanning markets and centrally designed/planner mechanisms alike. SUPPORTS the claim that Hurwicz and Reiter trace resource-allocation mechanisms across markets and central planners. NOTE: original annotation was a copy-paste error describing a '2×2 dilemma / engineering incentives' from an unrelated prime; rewritten to match the resource-allocation-mechanism claim.

• Social Dilemma
  • Game theory & economics: The canonical 2×2 social dilemma is the workhorse example of a dominant-strategy equilibrium that is Pareto-inefficient, and the seedbed of mechanism design — the discipline of engineering incentives so that cooperation (or truth-telling, or efficient provision) becomes individually rational rather than something agents must be cajoled into.

    This sourceCanonical treatment of mechanism design by a founder of the field; supports the characterization of the 2×2 dilemma as the seedbed of engineering incentives so that cooperation (or truth-telling, or efficient provision) becomes individually rational.

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