Selection in Insurance Markets

Einav, L., & Finkelstein, A. (2011). Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1), 115-138.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2011

Volume

25

Issue

1

Pages

115-138

DOI

10.1257/jep.25.1.115

DOI registrant

American Economic Association

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.1.115

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Adverse Selection

  • This sourceGraphical framework reviewing textbook adverse selection and modern empirical methods for testing for selection and separating it from moral hazard, plus advantageous selection — supports the prime's T3 citation on identification techniques for distinguishing adverse selection from moral hazard.

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