Making Votes Count¶
Cox, G. W. (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Keynesian Beauty Contest
- In voting and electoral strategy, strategic voting for the electable over the preferred candidate, primary voters modeling general-electorate appeal, and donors backing perceived front-runners all run the contest.
This sourceGame-theoretic analysis of strategic voting and elite coordination — voters and donors backing the candidate they expect others to back (the electable over the preferred), a higher-order-belief coordination dynamic.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
Cox's own abstract backs strategic voting and elite coordination as a game-theoretic problem in all electoral systems, but it does not state the primary-voter or donor-front-runner mechanisms the anchor names.
“Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems.”
- In voting and electoral strategy, strategic voting for the electable over the preferred candidate, primary voters modeling general-electorate appeal, and donors backing perceived front-runners all run the contest.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:2bf5d35df3f7 · see in the full table