Economic Analysis of Accident Law¶
Shavell, S. (1987). Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Harvard University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Risk Transfer
- The cost-minimizing asymmetry argument — risks should be borne by the party who can either prevent them at lowest cost or absorb them at lowest cost — becomes the master rule, with concrete derived results: large counterparties dominate by capital base, specialized counterparties by expertise, diversified counterparties by pooling, and governments by the power to tax, the ultimate risk-pooling mechanism.
This sourceDevelops the cost-minimizing principle that risk should be borne by the party who can prevent or absorb it most cheaply.
- The cost-minimizing asymmetry argument — risks should be borne by the party who can either prevent them at lowest cost or absorb them at lowest cost — becomes the master rule, with concrete derived results: large counterparties dominate by capital base, specialized counterparties by expertise, diversified counterparties by pooling, and governments by the power to tax, the ultimate risk-pooling mechanism.
Verification¶
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