Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure.¶
Van Huyck, J. B., Battalio, & Beil, R. O. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. The American Economic Review, 80(1), 234-248.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- The cost of switching is identical whether the cost is retraining (organizational) or retooling (technological), a structural equivalence Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) demonstrated experimentally across stag-hunt coordination games of varying scale.
This sourceExperimental demonstration that the same multi-equilibrium structure produces parallel coordination outcomes across group sizes and payoff scales — evidence of the pattern's structural transferability.
- The cost of switching is identical whether the cost is retraining (organizational) or retooling (technological), a structural equivalence Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990) demonstrated experimentally across stag-hunt coordination games of varying scale.
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