Regret Theory¶
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92(368), 805-824.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Counterfactual Proximity Weighting
- Decision theory and emotion: counterfactual regret (how much better could it have gone?) and relief (how much worse?) scale with the proximity of the alternative, not its mere existence; regret-driven choice models formalise the weighting.
This sourceFormalises choice under uncertainty in which the utility of an outcome is modified by anticipated regret/rejoicing measured against the forgone alternative.
- Decision theory and emotion: counterfactual regret (how much better could it have gone?) and relief (how much worse?) scale with the proximity of the alternative, not its mere existence; regret-driven choice models formalise the weighting.
- Counterfactual Reasoning
- Economics of post-decision regret and choice. Regret theory in economics (Bell 1985, Loomes-Sugden 1982)
This sourceFoundational regret-theory model in which choice anticipates the regret/rejoicing of comparing the chosen outcome to the counterfactual of foregone alternatives.
- Economics of post-decision regret and choice. Regret theory in economics (Bell 1985, Loomes-Sugden 1982)
- Regret
- Anticipated regret then feeds backward into choice, so the pattern couples a backward-looking evaluation to a forward-looking decision rule — the very anticipation of the future gap reshapes which act is taken now, a coupling that the regret-theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982) treats as a primitive of choice under uncertainty.
This sourceTreats anticipated regret as a primitive of choice under uncertainty and models regret as a comparison against the forgone alternative; supports the backward-to-forward coupling and the counterfactual-tree compression.
- Anticipated regret then feeds backward into choice, so the pattern couples a backward-looking evaluation to a forward-looking decision rule — the very anticipation of the future gap reshapes which act is taken now, a coupling that the regret-theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982) treats as a primitive of choice under uncertainty.
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