Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics¶
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Primes¶
- Variance Bounds Selection Response
- Under replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory, the rate of change of mean payoff equals the variance of payoff among strategies — the same identity in another substrate.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The book's abstract confirms replicator equations model how successful strategies spread in evolutionary game theory, the frame of the claim, but says nothing about the rate of mean payoff equalling payoff variance.
“Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success”
- Under replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory, the rate of change of mean payoff equals the variance of payoff among strategies — the same identity in another substrate.
Domain-specific¶
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:309bc200af0c · see in the full table