Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1998

DOI

10.1017/cbo9781139173179

ISBN

9780521623650

Link

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179

Cited from

mathematics

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Primes

• Variance Bounds Selection Response
  • Under replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory, the rate of change of mean payoff equals the variance of payoff among strategies — the same identity in another substrate.

Domain-specific

• Generalized Lotka–Volterra Equations
  • Outside population dynamics, the equation form can map to replicator or kinetic systems under transformations, as treatments of evolutionary games and Lotka–Volterra dynamics show.

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