Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma¶
Kreps, D. M. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245-252.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
Domain-specific¶
- Folk Theorem (Repeated Games)
- Industrial organization and tacit collusion — the standard theoretical account of how oligopolists sustain above-competitive prices without explicit agreement, the price-war punishment phase routinely invoked in antitrust analysis. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and the evolution of cooperation — the theorem grounds the legitimacy of cooperative equilibria in repeated PD, underwriting Axelrod's tournaments, tit-for-tat, and the repeated-cooperation literature. International relations and treaty compliance — states sustain cooperation on trade, arms control, and the environment without a world government because each state's discounted future depends on its reputation (Keohane, Axelrod). Contract theory and relational contracting — where formal contracts are incomplete, long-running buyer–supplier and employer–employee relationships sustain cooperation via the repeated-game mechanism (Baker–Gibbons–Murphy). Mechanism design — the theorem acts as a Constraint: designers cannot rely on equilibrium uniqueness in repeated settings without added structure (commitment devices, communication, contracts). Equilibrium-selection and refinement theory — the multiplicity the theorem creates motivates the entire post-1980 program (renegotiation-proofness, evolutionarily stable strategies in repeated games, behavioral selection criteria), since "it is an equilibrium" no longer discriminates. Reputation models of incomplete information — the Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson extension ports the same machinery to finitely repeated games by adding a small probability of a committed type
This sourceThat cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma can be sustained when one player may possibly be committed to Tit-for-Tat.
SupportedVerified against the source
- Industrial organization and tacit collusion — the standard theoretical account of how oligopolists sustain above-competitive prices without explicit agreement, the price-war punishment phase routinely invoked in antitrust analysis. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and the evolution of cooperation — the theorem grounds the legitimacy of cooperative equilibria in repeated PD, underwriting Axelrod's tournaments, tit-for-tat, and the repeated-cooperation literature. International relations and treaty compliance — states sustain cooperation on trade, arms control, and the environment without a world government because each state's discounted future depends on its reputation (Keohane, Axelrod). Contract theory and relational contracting — where formal contracts are incomplete, long-running buyer–supplier and employer–employee relationships sustain cooperation via the repeated-game mechanism (Baker–Gibbons–Murphy). Mechanism design — the theorem acts as a Constraint: designers cannot rely on equilibrium uniqueness in repeated settings without added structure (commitment devices, communication, contracts). Equilibrium-selection and refinement theory — the multiplicity the theorem creates motivates the entire post-1980 program (renegotiation-proofness, evolutionarily stable strategies in repeated games, behavioral selection criteria), since "it is an equilibrium" no longer discriminates. Reputation models of incomplete information — the Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson extension ports the same machinery to finitely repeated games by adding a small probability of a committed type
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