Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 245-252.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1982

Link

https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1verified

Cited from

information_theory

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Social Dilemma
  • Absent enforcement, repetition, or reputation, the anticipation of mutual defection unravels otherwise mutually beneficial commerce — the structural reason institutions of contract and escrow exist.

    This sourceShows how reputation and incomplete information sustain cooperation in repeated play; grounds the claim that anticipated mutual defection unravels otherwise beneficial exchange, the structural rationale for contract, reputation, and escrow institutions.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:30e50b836a8e · see in the full table