An Economic Analysis of Ransomware and Its Welfare Consequences.¶
Hernandez-Castro, J., Cartwright, E., & Cartwright, E. (2020). An Economic Analysis of Ransomware and Its Welfare Consequences. Royal Society Open Science, 7(3).
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coercion
- The compellence-is-harder lesson transfers from the Cuban quarantine to labor strikes (continuing pressure for a wage concession), to per-diem regulatory penalties (continuing pressure to correct a violation), and to ransomware (encryption held until payment)
This sourceEconomic analysis of ransomware as cyber-enabled extortion — encryption held until payment, with attackers sometimes withholding full decryption to sustain ongoing extortive pressure (compellent, continuing-cost coercion).
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Describes crypto-ransomware as encrypting files and returning them only for a ransom, backing the ransomware instance; it says nothing of compellence, strikes, per-diem penalties or Cuba.
“the malware encrypts and then deletes the original data files and asks for a ransom to hand them back to the victim”
- The compellence-is-harder lesson transfers from the Cuban quarantine to labor strikes (continuing pressure for a wage concession), to per-diem regulatory penalties (continuing pressure to correct a violation), and to ransomware (encryption held until payment)
- Compellence
- The analysis of why compellence is hard, that the target's compliance is publicly visible and reputationally costly, transferred directly into the analysis of why public ransom payments encourage future attacks while insurer-mediated payments do not.
This sourceEconomic analysis of ransomware as cyber-enabled extortion; shows that meeting extortion demands and visible willingness to pay shape attacker pricing and incentives to continue/escalate attacks. (Resolves needs-source-907 for the 'visible payment encourages future attacks' claim.)
- The analysis of why compellence is hard, that the target's compliance is publicly visible and reputationally costly, transferred directly into the analysis of why public ransom payments encourage future attacks while insurer-mediated payments do not.
Verification¶
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