The rule of law and its virtue

Raz, J. (1979). The rule of law and its virtue. The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality.

Type

Book chapter

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1979

Link

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.003.0011matched

Cited from

law_governance, political_science

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Primes

• No One Is Above the Rules
  • Rule of law requires not merely the existence of rules, but their application according to publicly known procedures that bind all parties, a distinction Raz (1979) sharpened by arguing that the rule of law is fundamentally an instrumental virtue separable from substantive justice — law that does not guide conduct because it is unknown, retroactive, or selectively applied fails the rule-of-law test even if its content is benign.
• Rule of Law
  • In its home domain — law and politics — the entities are persons and institutions, but the pattern is not specific to systems that contain people: it is equally the shape of a physical law that admits no exempt body, or a formal system whose axioms bind every derivation including its own, a substrate-generality Raz (1979) anticipated by treating the rule of law as a formal-structural virtue separable from the normative content of the legal system in which it appears.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:3647af68e21b · see in the full table