The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.¶
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(4), 387-389.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Competition
- When the answer is yes, the system exhibits competition; when the answer is no — when the pie can grow or the prize is non-rivalrous — the dynamics belong to a different family entirely.
This sourceFounding statement of public-goods theory: defines collective-consumption (public) goods by their non-rivalrous, non-excludable character, establishing the formal distinction between rivalrous goods (one agent's consumption subtracts from another's) and non-rivalrous ones — the boundary that separates competitive payoff structures from non-rivalrous settings.
- When the answer is yes, the system exhibits competition; when the answer is no — when the pie can grow or the prize is non-rivalrous — the dynamics belong to a different family entirely.
- Free Riding
- Free riding occurs when an actor derives benefit from a collectively-produced good or service without contributing proportionately to its production, undermining the incentive structure that sustains the good, a structure Samuelson (1954) first formalized in his theory of public expenditure.
This sourceFoundational formalization of public goods (non-rivalrous, non-excludable) and the optimal-provision condition; supports the claim that Samuelson first formalized the public-expenditure structure underlying free riding.
- Free riding occurs when an actor derives benefit from a collectively-produced good or service without contributing proportionately to its production, undermining the incentive structure that sustains the good, a structure Samuelson (1954) first formalized in his theory of public expenditure.
- Public Goods
- The modern formal treatment originates with Paul Samuelson's "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" (Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954)
This sourceThe foundational public-goods distinction (non-rivalrous, non-excludable); essential for distinguishing commons (rivalrous, non-excludable) from public goods. Cross-DP candidate: Samuelson-1954 likely shared with DP-08 public-finance batch (public goods theory); also foundational to DP-01 mechanism_design (#501) if that prime cites public-goods definitions.
- The modern formal treatment originates with Paul Samuelson's "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" (Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954)
- Tragedy of the Commons
- The policy remedies are thus opposite in structure.
This sourceThe foundational public-goods distinction (non-rivalrous, non-excludable); essential for distinguishing commons (rivalrous, non-excludable) from public goods. Cross-DP candidate: Samuelson-1954 likely shared with DP-08 public-finance batch (public goods theory); also foundational to DP-01 mechanism_design (#501) if that prime cites public-goods definitions.
- The policy remedies are thus opposite in structure.
Mechanisms¶
- Public Funding or Taxation
- - Define the civic-good boundary. Establish that the benefit is genuinely broad and non-excludable, so universal funding — rather than a club or targeted levy — is the right instrument.
This sourceDefines collective consumption goods as benefits enjoyed in common without one person’s consumption subtracting from another’s.
- - Define the civic-good boundary. Establish that the benefit is genuinely broad and non-excludable, so universal funding — rather than a club or targeted levy — is the right instrument.
Verification¶
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