Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment.¶
Lutz, D. S. (1994). Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment. American Political Science Review, 88(2), 355-370.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Mechanisms¶
- Constitutional Rule
- Entrenches by raising the amendment cost. The rule is changeable only through a heavier procedure than ordinary decisions — a supermajority, a waiting period, ratification by a broader body — so stability is a designed property, not a hope.
This sourceShows that amendment difficulty—including elevated voting and ratification procedures—is a constitutional design variable that predicts amendment rate and stability.
- Entrenches by raising the amendment cost. The rule is changeable only through a heavier procedure than ordinary decisions — a supermajority, a waiting period, ratification by a broader body — so stability is a designed property, not a hope.
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