Suit, Settlement, and Trial¶
Shavell, S. (1982). Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs. Journal of Legal Studies, 11(1), 55-81.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- War Of Attrition
- Because the equilibrium is closed-form, the transfer is unusually sharp: a firm asking whether to price below cost to drive out a rival can reason about the equilibrium duration and expected dissipation using the same result derived for animal displays, and a litigation reformer can predict how switching from each-party-pays-own-fees to loser-pays restructures the attrition mechanism toward a bonded contest with shorter nuisance-suit duration.
This sourceAnalyzes how loser-pays versus each-party-pays fee allocation restructures litigation incentives and nuisance-suit filing.
- Because the equilibrium is closed-form, the transfer is unusually sharp: a firm asking whether to price below cost to drive out a rival can reason about the equilibrium duration and expected dissipation using the same result derived for animal displays, and a litigation reformer can predict how switching from each-party-pays-own-fees to loser-pays restructures the attrition mechanism toward a bonded contest with shorter nuisance-suit duration.
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Registry ID ref:39b35b706b81 · see in the full table