Über Begriff und Gegenstand (On Concept and Object).¶
Frege, G. (1892). Über Begriff und Gegenstand (On Concept and Object). Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 16, 192-205.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Predicate
- In philosophy predication is the foundational logical act — something is something — and the contested status of certain predicates ("is just," "is conscious") drives much inquiry.
This sourceFoundational analysis of predication — a concept as a function from objects to truth values.
- In philosophy predication is the foundational logical act — something is something — and the contested status of certain predicates ("is just," "is conscious") drives much inquiry.
Domain-specific¶
- Unity of the Proposition
- Frege’s function–argument and concept–object distinctions make predicates essentially incomplete or unsaturated in a way intended to explain their combining role
Supported in partVerified against the source
- Frege’s function–argument and concept–object distinctions make predicates essentially incomplete or unsaturated in a way intended to explain their combining role
Verification¶
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