Über Begriff und Gegenstand (On Concept and Object).¶
Frege, G. (1892). Über Begriff und Gegenstand (On Concept and Object). Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 16, 192-205.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Predicate
- In philosophy predication is the foundational logical act — something is something — and the contested status of certain predicates ("is just," "is conscious") drives much inquiry.
This sourceFoundational analysis of predication — a concept as a function from objects to truth values.
- In philosophy predication is the foundational logical act — something is something — and the contested status of certain predicates ("is just," "is conscious") drives much inquiry.
Domain-specific¶
- Unity of the Proposition
- Frege’s function–argument and concept–object distinctions make predicates essentially incomplete or unsaturated in a way intended to explain their combining role
This sourceThe locus of the concept-object distinction: the concept 'is predicative', it is the referent of a grammatical predicate, and its incompleteness is what is meant to explain how the parts of a thought hold together; the function-argument analysis it presupposes is set out in Frege's 1891 'Function and Concept'.
- Frege’s function–argument and concept–object distinctions make predicates essentially incomplete or unsaturated in a way intended to explain their combining role
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