Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information¶
Zinkevich, M., Johanson, Bowling, & Piccione, C. (2007). Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 20.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Mechanisms¶
- Exploitability Matrix Review
- Nudging the raise frequency up closes most of the gap, driving the mix toward the minimax value
This sourceShows regret minimization driving a mixed strategy toward equilibrium, where a worst-case opponent earns no excess value.
- Nudging the raise frequency up closes most of the gap, driving the mix toward the minimax value
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Registry ID ref:3bd72ca2be2b · see in the full table