Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies¶
Aumann. (1974). Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Domain-specific¶
- Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
- That coordinated case is the strictly more general correlated equilibrium, which supersets the mixed-equilibrium set — mixed equilibrium is the independent special case.
This sourceThat correlated strategies achieve as an equilibrium any payoff vector in the convex hull of the mixed-strategy (Nash) equilibrium payoffs and even points outside it, with mixed strategies being the uncorrelated case.
SupportedVerified against the work's full text
“by the use of correlated strategies in a non-cooperative game, one can achieve as an equilibrium any payoff vector in the convex hull of the mixed strategy”
- That coordinated case is the strictly more general correlated equilibrium, which supersets the mixed-equilibrium set — mixed equilibrium is the independent special case.
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Registry ID ref:3ca6ccb67b50 · see in the full table