Evolution and the Theory of Games¶
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
6 citations across 6 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Anti-Coordination Game
- Hawk-Dove, niche partitioning, Hotelling location choice, the CSMA protocol family, and Fisher's sex-ratio argument are all instances of the same anti-coordination logic applied to different substrates.
This sourceSystematic development of the ESS, the Hawk-Dove payoff matrix and mixed equilibrium p* = V/C, and the Bourgeois convention (play Hawk if owner, Dove if intruder) as an uncorrelated-asymmetry symmetry-breaker.
- Hawk-Dove, niche partitioning, Hotelling location choice, the CSMA protocol family, and Fisher's sex-ratio argument are all instances of the same anti-coordination logic applied to different substrates.
- Arbitrage (Generalized)
- … opportunity costs create gains from reallocation across the boundary. Maynard Smith (1982) further shows in his evolutionary game-theoretic analysis that frequency-dependent fitness creates niche-occupation arbitrage—agents profit by pursuing strategies whose payoff is highest where competitors are absent.
This sourceFrequency-dependent selection and ESS analysis show that fitness payoffs depend on the strategy distribution; agents profit by occupying niches where competitors are absent—biological arbitrage as niche-finding.
- … opportunity costs create gains from reallocation across the boundary. Maynard Smith (1982) further shows in his evolutionary game-theoretic analysis that frequency-dependent fitness creates niche-occupation arbitrage—agents profit by pursuing strategies whose payoff is highest where competitors are absent.
- Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- Animals contest a resource of value \(V\); a Hawk escalates and risks injury cost \(C\), a Dove displays and retreats.
This sourceDevelops the Hawk–Dove game, derives the mixed ESS playing Hawk with probability V/C, and establishes the ESS-vs-Nash refinement.
- Animals contest a resource of value \(V\); a Hawk escalates and risks injury cost \(C\), a Dove displays and retreats.
- Livelock
- Ecology and behaviour — ritualised symmetric display contests; cyclic multi-species dynamics with no monotonic progress on a state variable that ordinarily would move.
This sourceRitualized symmetric display contests and evolutionarily stable strategies in animal conflict.
- Ecology and behaviour — ritualised symmetric display contests; cyclic multi-species dynamics with no monotonic progress on a state variable that ordinarily would move.
- Nash Equilibrium
- Evolutionary biology — the evolutionarily stable strategy is a refinement of Nash for evolutionary dynamics, stable against invasion by mutant strategies; it explains hawk-dove balances, stable sex ratios, and mixed foraging strategies.
This sourceDevelops the evolutionarily stable strategy as a Nash refinement for population dynamics, explaining hawk-dove balances, stable sex ratios, and mixed strategies, and grounding adversarial/population game analysis.
- Evolutionary biology — the evolutionarily stable strategy is a refinement of Nash for evolutionary dynamics, stable against invasion by mutant strategies; it explains hawk-dove balances, stable sex ratios, and mixed foraging strategies.
Domain-specific¶
- Fisher's Principle (Sex-Ratio Equilibrium)
- This argument can be read game-theoretically — Fisher did not state it in those terms — and is recognised in hindsight as an early instance of what Maynard Smith would later formalize as an evolutionarily stable strategy: a population composition that cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy
This sourceMaynard Smith's formalisation of the evolutionarily stable strategy — the uninvadability condition this sentence paraphrases. The retrospective placing of Fisher's sex-ratio argument as an early instance of one, and the observation that Fisher did not frame it game-theoretically, are not sourced to this book.
- This argument can be read game-theoretically — Fisher did not state it in those terms — and is recognised in hindsight as an early instance of what Maynard Smith would later formalize as an evolutionarily stable strategy: a population composition that cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy
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