Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods¶
Green, & Laffont. (1977). Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods. Econometrica.
Cited by¶
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Domain-specific¶
- Vickrey Auction
- The designer reasons from two desired properties — efficiency (the item reaches the highest valuer) and strategy-proofness (truthful reporting dominant) in a quasilinear private-value setting — to a near-unique class of mechanisms, because the Green–Laffont result collapses the admissible designs essentially to VCG.
This sourceThat the Green-Laffont result narrows efficient, strategy-proof mechanisms in the quasilinear private-value setting essentially to the VCG class.
- The designer reasons from two desired properties — efficiency (the item reaches the highest valuer) and strategy-proofness (truthful reporting dominant) in a quasilinear private-value setting — to a near-unique class of mechanisms, because the Green–Laffont result collapses the admissible designs essentially to VCG.
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