Propositional Attitude Reports.

Nelson, M. (2026). Propositional Attitude Reports. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Type

Reference work

Intellectual base

Reference work

Year

2026

Link

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Domain-specific

• Frege's Puzzles
  • A person may believe that Hesperus is visible in the evening while not believing that Phosphorus is visible in the evening, because the person does not know that the two names co-refer.
• Sense and Reference
  • This reference shift explains why substitution of co-referring names can preserve truth in an ordinary extensional sentence but fail inside a belief report.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2026/entries/prop-attitude-reports/ ×1

Registry ID ref:3db731031cbd · see in the full table