Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory¶
Roughgarden. (2016). Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Domain-specific¶
- Dominated Strategy
- The second result — truth-telling as a dominant strategy — is the foundation of mechanism design's gold standard, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC): a mechanism satisfying DSIC makes truthful reporting optimal for each participant without any assumptions about the beliefs, types, or strategies of others, making it robust in a way that equilibrium-dependent mechanisms are not
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“Definition 2.3 ([Dominant-Strategy] Incentive Compatible) An auction is [dominant-strategy] incentive compatible”
- The second result — truth-telling as a dominant strategy — is the foundation of mechanism design's gold standard, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC): a mechanism satisfying DSIC makes truthful reporting optimal for each participant without any assumptions about the beliefs, types, or strategies of others, making it robust in a way that equilibrium-dependent mechanisms are not
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