Moving Target Defense¶
Jajodia, S., Ghosh, A. K., Swarup, V., Wang, C., & Wang, X. S. (2011). Moving Target Defense: Creating Asymmetric Uncertainty for Cyber Threats. Springer.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Mixed Strategy
- In cybersecurity moving-target defense — rotating addresses, topologies, and software versions — denies attackers a stable reconnaissance surface.
This sourceRotating addresses, configurations, and software versions to deny attackers a stable reconnaissance surface.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The book's abstract frames moving target defense as randomization and diversification that advantages defenders, but never names topologies or a denial of reconnaissance.
“Moving Target Defense is enabled by technical trends in recent years, including virtualization and workload migration on commodity systems, widespread and redundant network connectivity, instruction set and address space layout randomization, just-in-time compilers, among other techniques.”
- In cybersecurity moving-target defense — rotating addresses, topologies, and software versions — denies attackers a stable reconnaissance surface.
- Variation Strategies
- Both strategies accept overhead and some operational friction to reduce the predictability that attackers depend on, an approach Jajodia, Ghosh, Swarup, Wang, and Wang (2011) systematize as moving-target defense in their foundational treatment of cyber asymmetry.
This sourceFoundational edited volume systematizing moving-target defense; frames address-space, configuration, and platform randomization as deliberate variation strategies that raise attacker cost.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The volume's own abstract confirms it systematizes moving-target defense around asymmetric costs borne by defenders, but says nothing about the overhead or operational friction the claim also asserts.
“Moving Target Defense which is motivated by the asymmetric costs borne by cyber defenders takes an advantage afforded to attackers and reverses it to advantage defenders.”
- Both strategies accept overhead and some operational friction to reduce the predictability that attackers depend on, an approach Jajodia, Ghosh, Swarup, Wang, and Wang (2011) systematize as moving-target defense in their foundational treatment of cyber asymmetry.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 2 of 2 citations: 2 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:3f1f0537a820 · see in the full table