Implementing cost-benefit analysis when preferences are distorted¶
Adler, M. D., & Posner, E. A. (2000). Implementing cost-benefit analysis when preferences are distorted. Journal of Legal Studies.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 1 artifact.
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Primes¶
- Proportionality
- Balancing also depends on how harms are counted, as Adler and Posner (2000) demonstrate in their analysis of cost-benefit aggregation: the choice between summing individual welfare effects and protecting the worst-off individual yields radically different policy verdicts.
This sourceAnalyzes welfare-aggregation choices in cost-benefit analysis: utilitarian summation vs. distributional weighting yield divergent verdicts on the same intervention.
- Administrative agencies invoke proportionality through cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the regulatory-implementation framework Adler and Posner (2000) develop to convert proportionality assessment into welfare-equivalent monetary terms while flagging its distortions.
This sourceDevelops the regulatory-implementation framework that converts proportionality into welfare-equivalent monetary terms while documenting distortions from preference biases, monetization gaps, and distributional asymmetries.
- Balancing also depends on how harms are counted, as Adler and Posner (2000) demonstrate in their analysis of cost-benefit aggregation: the choice between summing individual welfare effects and protecting the worst-off individual yields radically different policy verdicts.
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