Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games¶
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., & Smith, V. L. (1996). Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games. American Economic Review.
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1 citation across 1 artifact.
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Domain-specific¶
- Dictator Game
- The double-blind protocol, in which neither the experimenter nor anyone else can identify the dictator's individual choice, substantially reduces transfers
This sourceDouble-blind dictator treatments showing that transfers fall substantially once the experimenter cannot identify an individual dictator's choice, isolating the observability component of giving.
- The double-blind protocol, in which neither the experimenter nor anyone else can identify the dictator's individual choice, substantially reduces transfers
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