Constitutional Amendments¶
Albert, R. (2019). Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford University Press.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Open-Closed Principle
- In constitutional design, an inviolate core of rights and governmental structure is paired with an amendable surface of statute and regulation — and the amendment procedure itself is kernel-protected, requiring a supermajority to touch.
This sourceAnalyzes constitutional entrenchment and unamendability — how an inviolable core (rights and governmental structure) is walled off behind supermajority/ratification amendment procedures that are themselves kernel-protected, so the core resists the churn of ordinary politics.
- In constitutional design, an inviolate core of rights and governmental structure is paired with an amendable surface of statute and regulation — and the amendment procedure itself is kernel-protected, requiring a supermajority to touch.
Verification¶
This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.
Registry ID ref:42140aeb4448 · see in the full table