The economics of matching¶
Roth, A. E. (1982). The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research, 7(4), 617-628.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Two-Sided Matching
- Roth's impossibility and strategy-proofness results establish when truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy and when no stable mechanism can be strategy-proof for both sides at once.
This sourceEstablishes the strategy-proofness boundary: no stable matching mechanism makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy for both sides at once, though deferred acceptance is strategy-proof for the proposing side.
- Roth's impossibility and strategy-proofness results establish when truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy and when no stable mechanism can be strategy-proof for both sides at once.
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