Preventing Regulatory Capture¶
Carpenter, D., & Moss, D. A. (2014). Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Regulatory Capture
- Unlike corruption, which is individual malfeasance, capture is institutional: the regulating body's decision-making apparatus itself becomes an instrument of the regulated, as Carpenter and Moss (2014) emphasize in distinguishing capture from individual corruption.
This sourceModern synthesis defining capture as institutional redirection rather than individual malfeasance and surveying mechanisms across domains.
- Unlike corruption, which is individual malfeasance, capture is institutional: the regulating body's decision-making apparatus itself becomes an instrument of the regulated, as Carpenter and Moss (2014) emphasize in distinguishing capture from individual corruption.
Mechanisms¶
- Norm Legitimacy Review
- A review can become a rubber stamp — theater that relegitimizes whatever already exists — or be captured itself by the very interest it is meant to check
This sourceDefines regulatory capture as regulation directed toward an industry’s interests through that industry’s action.
- A review can become a rubber stamp — theater that relegitimizes whatever already exists — or be captured itself by the very interest it is meant to check
Verification¶
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