Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP '09)¶
Klein, G., Elphinstone, Heiser, Andronick, Cock, Derrin, Elkaduwe, et al. (2009). Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP '09). ACM.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Mathematical Induction
- … proving**, induction is a central proof tactic in Coq, Isabelle, Lean, Agda, and ACL2; the Boyer-Moore family of provers (Nqthm, ACL2) introduced sophisticated heuristics for selecting induction principles, generalising goals, and guessing inductive variables; industrial-scale verified software (the seL4 microkernel
This sourceACM. End-to-end functional-correctness proof of an OS microkernel; demonstrates that strict isolation between kernel and user space concentrates analytical complexity into a small bounded region, making formal verification tractable.
- … proving**, induction is a central proof tactic in Coq, Isabelle, Lean, Agda, and ACL2; the Boyer-Moore family of provers (Nqthm, ACL2) introduced sophisticated heuristics for selecting induction principles, generalising goals, and guessing inductive variables; industrial-scale verified software (the seL4 microkernel
- Sequestration
- Sequestration simplifies system analysis by partitioning hazardous or sensitive elements into dedicated, bounded analysis domains. Klein et al. (2009) demonstrate this analytical economy concretely with the seL4 microkernel: by formally isolating untrusted user-space code from a small verified kernel, the proof obligation shrinks to roughly 8,700 lines of C, enabling end-to-end functional-correctness verification that would be intractable in a monolithic system.
This sourceACM. End-to-end functional-correctness proof of an OS microkernel; demonstrates that strict isolation between kernel and user space concentrates analytical complexity into a small bounded region, making formal verification tractable.
- Sequestration simplifies system analysis by partitioning hazardous or sensitive elements into dedicated, bounded analysis domains. Klein et al. (2009) demonstrate this analytical economy concretely with the seL4 microkernel: by formally isolating untrusted user-space code from a small verified kernel, the proof obligation shrinks to roughly 8,700 lines of C, enabling end-to-end functional-correctness verification that would be intractable in a monolithic system.
Verification¶
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