Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games

McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games. Games and Economic Behavior.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1995

DOI

10.1006/game.1995.1023

DOI registrant

Elsevier

Link

https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Domain-specific

• Quantal response equilibrium
  • QRE models boundedly precise choice rather than best-response certainty; logit and other response functions introduce sensitivity parameters and can yield predictions distinct from Nash equilibrium.
• Traveler's Dilemma
  • In practice, agents do not perform dominance elimination at depth; they act at shallow reasoning depths, and the Quantal Response Equilibrium framework (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998) accounts for the observed behavior by injecting small choice errors that unravel the deep chain, predicting the observed high-claim concentration and its sensitivity to the bonus parameter

    This sourceThe Quantal Response Equilibrium framework, in which small choice errors unravel a long dominance chain and yield high claims responsive to the bonus parameter.

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