Learning how to cooperate¶
Crawford, V. P., & Haller, H. (1990). Learning how to cooperate: Optimal play in repeated coordination games. Econometrica, 58(3), 571-595.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- "What would it take to shift to an alternative equilibrium?"—the kind of pre-play and salience analysis Crawford and Haller (1990) developed for repeated coordination games.
This sourceAnalyzes how players use precedent and salience to select among equilibria in repeated coordination; supports counterfactual reasoning about which early events make an equilibrium focal.
- "What would it take to shift to an alternative equilibrium?"—the kind of pre-play and salience analysis Crawford and Haller (1990) developed for repeated coordination games.
Verification¶
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Registry ID ref:4b65da74c63b · see in the full table