Violence and Social Orders¶
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Checks and Balances
- The empirical track record is mixed, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) show in tracing how "open-access orders" depend on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks rather than personalist deals.
This sourceDistinguishes "limited-access" from "open-access" orders and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks — rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force — to constrain elite predation.
- The empirical track record is mixed, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) show in tracing how "open-access orders" depend on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks rather than personalist deals.
- Governance
- It specifies not just who decides, but why their decision binds others, how power is checked, who answers for mistakes, and how the system itself can evolve, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) document across the long sweep of human political-economic orders.
This sourceDistinguishes 'limited-access' (natural-state) from 'open-access' orders across the long sweep of recorded history and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks—rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force—to constrain elite predation.
- It specifies not just who decides, but why their decision binds others, how power is checked, who answers for mistakes, and how the system itself can evolve, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) document across the long sweep of human political-economic orders.
- Rule of Law
- The pattern North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) identify as the rule-of-law dividend — predictability and trust that lower transaction costs and undergird open-access social orders — replicates inside open-source governance, where uniform reflexive rule-binding is the precondition for sustained voluntary contribution.
This sourceDistinguishes "limited-access" from "open-access" orders and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks—rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force—to constrain elite predation.
- The pattern North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) identify as the rule-of-law dividend — predictability and trust that lower transaction costs and undergird open-access social orders — replicates inside open-source governance, where uniform reflexive rule-binding is the precondition for sustained voluntary contribution.
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