Violence and Social Orders¶
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Checks and Balances
- The empirical track record is mixed, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) show in tracing how "open-access orders" depend on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks rather than personalist deals.
This sourceDistinguishes "limited-access" from "open-access" orders and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks — rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force — to constrain elite predation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract supports only the limited-access vs open-access distinction, not the 'mixed empirical track record' or the self-policing-checks mechanism.
“In contrast, modern societies create open access to economic and political organizations, fostering political and economic competition.”
- The empirical track record is mixed, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) show in tracing how "open-access orders" depend on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks rather than personalist deals.
- Governance
- It specifies not just who decides, but why their decision binds others, how power is checked, who answers for mistakes, and how the system itself can evolve, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) document across the long sweep of human political-economic orders.
This sourceDistinguishes 'limited-access' (natural-state) from 'open-access' orders across the long sweep of recorded history and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks—rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force—to constrain elite predation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The book's abstract backs only the natural-state vs open-access framework and a long historical frame; it does not itself state the enumerated governance functions (binding decisions, checks, accountability, evolution).
“The book provides a framework for understanding the two types of social orders, why open access societies are both politically and economically more developed, and how some 25 countries have made the transition between the two types.”
- It specifies not just who decides, but why their decision binds others, how power is checked, who answers for mistakes, and how the system itself can evolve, as North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) document across the long sweep of human political-economic orders.
- Rule of Law
- The pattern North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) identify as the rule-of-law dividend — predictability and trust that lower transaction costs and undergird open-access social orders — replicates inside open-source governance, where uniform reflexive rule-binding is the precondition for sustained voluntary contribution.
This sourceDistinguishes "limited-access" from "open-access" orders and shows how the latter rely on impersonal, self-policing institutional checks—rule of law, depersonalized organizations, civilian control of force—to constrain elite predation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract supplies only the limited-access vs open-access distinction and the claim that open-access orders are more developed; it states nothing about a rule-of-law dividend, transaction costs, trust, or open-source governance.
“In contrast, modern societies create open access to economic and political organizations, fostering political and economic competition. The book provides a framework for understanding the two types of social orders, why open access societies are both politically and economically more developed, and how some 25 countries have made the transition between the two types.”
- The pattern North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) identify as the rule-of-law dividend — predictability and trust that lower transaction costs and undergird open-access social orders — replicates inside open-source governance, where uniform reflexive rule-binding is the precondition for sustained voluntary contribution.
Verification¶
Does it exist? Confirmed. This work's DOI resolves to a registered record, which fixes its identity. That is all it fixes.
Does it back the claim? Read against the text for 3 of 3 citations: 3 supported in part. Each verdict is shown under its citation below, with what in the work backs the sentence.
Support is checked per citation rather than per work — the same source can be cited soundly in one article and wrongly in another. Per-citation recording began recently, so a citation with no recorded check is a gap in the record rather than evidence it went unchecked.
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.
Registry ID ref:4be80131a76a · see in the full table