Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent

Cohen, B. (2003). Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 68-72.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2003

Link

https://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/lib/cohen03a.html

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Cooperation
  • Computer science: distributed consensus protocols, peer-to-peer file sharing, and blockchain validation, where nodes must contribute resources for system benefit while protocol design penalizes those who only consume.

    This sourceShows the BitTorrent tit-for-tat 'choking' mechanism rewards contributing peers and penalizes free-riders (leechers), engineering cooperation among self-interested nodes.

Verification

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