Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent

Cohen, B. (2003). Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent. Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, 68-72.

Type

Conference paper

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2003

Pages

68-72

Link

https://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/lib/cohen03a.html

Cited from

economics_finance

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Cooperation
  • Computer science: distributed consensus protocols, peer-to-peer file sharing, and blockchain validation, where nodes must contribute resources for system benefit while protocol design penalizes those who only consume.

    This sourceShows the BitTorrent tit-for-tat 'choking' mechanism rewards contributing peers and penalizes free-riders (leechers), engineering cooperation among self-interested nodes.

Domain-specific

• Peer-to-Peer Architecture
  • BitTorrent peers exchange file pieces, IPFS nodes provide content-addressed blocks, and P2PTV viewers can forward parts of a stream.

Verification

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Links previously used in the corpus

Before the registry existed this work was also linked 1 other way.

• https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/archive/6.824-2007/papers/cohen-btecon.pdf ×1

Registry ID ref:4d251b87a2b9 · see in the full table