Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models.¶
Cooper, R., & John, A. (1988). Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(3), 441-463.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
- Coordination failures are about mistiming and information asymmetry; equilibrium selection problems are about multiplicity and arbitrariness, a distinction Cooper and John (1988) drew sharply in their analysis of macroeconomic coordinating failures with strategic complementarities.
This sourceShows how strategic complementarities generate multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria; distinguishes multiplicity-driven coordination failures from information-driven mistiming.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract backs only the multiplicity half of the claim: strategic complementarities in payoffs can yield multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria; it says nothing about mistiming or information asymmetry.
“This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. ... We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked.”
- Coordination failures are about mistiming and information asymmetry; equilibrium selection problems are about multiplicity and arbitrariness, a distinction Cooper and John (1988) drew sharply in their analysis of macroeconomic coordinating failures with strategic complementarities.
- Strategic Complementarity
- Macroeconomics: when firms set prices expecting others to hold theirs, coordinated price stickiness results; investment complementarities produce coordinated booms and busts.
This sourceEstablishes strategic complementarity in macroeconomic coordination, deriving multiple equilibria and the threshold structure of coordination-game payoffs.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract backs strategic complementarities as a basis for macro coordination failures and multiple equilibria, but not the claim's price-stickiness or boom-bust clauses.
“This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures.”
- Macroeconomics: when firms set prices expecting others to hold theirs, coordinated price stickiness results; investment complementarities produce coordinated booms and busts.
Verification¶
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