Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models.

Cooper, R., & John, A. (1988). Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(3), 441-463.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1988

DOI

10.2307/1885539

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1885539

Cited from

economics_finance, information_theory

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Coordination Problem and Equilibrium Selection
  • Coordination failures are about mistiming and information asymmetry; equilibrium selection problems are about multiplicity and arbitrariness, a distinction Cooper and John (1988) drew sharply in their analysis of macroeconomic coordinating failures with strategic complementarities.

    This sourceShows how strategic complementarities generate multiple, Pareto-rankable equilibria; distinguishes multiplicity-driven coordination failures from information-driven mistiming.

• Strategic Complementarity
  • Macroeconomics: when firms set prices expecting others to hold theirs, coordinated price stickiness results; investment complementarities produce coordinated booms and busts.

    This sourceEstablishes strategic complementarity in macroeconomic coordination, deriving multiple equilibria and the threshold structure of coordination-game payoffs.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:4ecee811ad3c · see in the full table