Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, 50(1).

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

1982

DOI

10.2307/1912531

Link

https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531

Cited from

economics

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Bargaining Power
  • Every step of the pattern is comparative; nothing about either party's absolute resources enters it, only the ratio of what each stands to lose by walking away.

    This sourceShows the unique subgame-perfect division of an alternating-offer bargain is fixed by the parties' relative impatience and disagreement payoffs rather than by absolute resources or by the sequence of concessions made along the way.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:4ee3c594783b · see in the full table