Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque¶
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école américaine. Econometrica, 21(4), 503-546.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Expected Utility
- By the same token, the concept exposes when a decision rule departs from the benchmark: prospect theory's overweighting of small probabilities, the Allais paradox, and the Ellsberg ambiguity aversion are all defined and measured as precise deviations from the expected-utility baseline, which means the baseline supplies the very coordinate system in which irrationality becomes legible.
This sourcePresents the Allais paradox: systematic preference reversals that violate the expected-utility (independence) axiom, measured as a precise departure from the benchmark.
- By the same token, the concept exposes when a decision rule departs from the benchmark: prospect theory's overweighting of small probabilities, the Allais paradox, and the Ellsberg ambiguity aversion are all defined and measured as precise deviations from the expected-utility baseline, which means the baseline supplies the very coordinate system in which irrationality becomes legible.
- Paradox
- in decision theory; sleeping beauty paradox; reflection principles in epistemology revealing tension between first- and higher-order beliefs. Decision-theoretic paradoxes
This sourcePresents the Allais paradox: systematic preference reversals that violate the expected-utility axioms, measured as a precise departure from the benchmark.
- in decision theory; sleeping beauty paradox; reflection principles in epistemology revealing tension between first- and higher-order beliefs. Decision-theoretic paradoxes
- Risk Aversion
- Not always descriptively accurate: real decisions often violate expected utility — probability weighting (Allais paradox)
This sourcePresents the Allais paradox: systematic preference reversals that violate the independence axiom of expected utility, a precise empirical departure from the EU benchmark.
- Not always descriptively accurate: real decisions often violate expected utility — probability weighting (Allais paradox)
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