Collective action and the evolution of social norms

Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158.

Type

Journal article

Intellectual base

Primary research

Year

2000

Volume

14

Issue

3

Pages

137-158

DOI registrant

American Economic Association

Link

https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.137matched

Cited from

sociology_anthropology

Cited by

3 citations across 3 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Social Capital
  • Development economics examines how village-level trust networks enable informal credit, mutual insurance, and collective infrastructure provision (Ostrom's common-pool resource governance)

    This sourceOstrom collective action norm evolution cooperation commons.

• Social Norms
  • A celebrity's public violation can license others; a crisis that disrupts the enforcement infrastructure can let norms collapse (looting during disasters, wartime breakdown of civility norms)

    This sourceOstrom collective action norm evolution cooperation commons.

Domain-specific

• Contingent cooperator
  • … constitutive identity and a convenient observable transfers from A canonical example satisfies the full defining rule of Contingent cooperator with assumptions and conventions explicit. to A careful use of Contingent cooperator tests the constitutive rule and nearest confusable rather than relying on the label alone..

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