Delegating Powers

Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1999). Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge University Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1999

DOI

10.1017/cbo9780511609312

ISBN

9780521669603

Link

https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609312

Cited from

military_strategic_studies

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Primes

• Authority Delegation Under Uncertainty
  • Emergency Government: Standing delegations of authority to field commanders (disaster response), public health officers (epidemic containment), or fire chiefs (resource allocation during wildfires) before specific events are known, a pattern Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) analyze as the legislative tradeoff between political control and bureaucratic expertise under uncertainty.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:541653b80848 · see in the full table