The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality¶
Diamond, R., McQuade, T., & Qian, F. (2019). The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco. American Economic Review, 109(9), 3365-3394.
Cited by¶
3 citations across 3 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Intervention-Coupled Harm
- The pattern recurs in regulatory design (disclosure rules reduce information asymmetry by the same mechanism that enables strategic disclosure-timing and complexity-driven obfuscation), in economic policy (rent control reduces prices for current tenants by reducing the return on housing investment, the very mechanism that reduces new supply; minimum wages raise wages for retained workers via the same price-floor that prices out marginal hires),
This sourceShows rent control lowers rents for sitting tenants through the same reduced-return mechanism that reduces rental-housing supply.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Supports only the rent-control clause: rent control benefited covered tenants while landlords cut rental supply by 15% via condo conversion and redevelopment; disclosure rules and minimum wages are not covered.
“Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase”
- The pattern recurs in regulatory design (disclosure rules reduce information asymmetry by the same mechanism that enables strategic disclosure-timing and complexity-driven obfuscation), in economic policy (rent control reduces prices for current tenants by reducing the return on housing investment, the very mechanism that reduces new supply; minimum wages raise wages for retained workers via the same price-floor that prices out marginal hires),
- Side Effect
- Economic policy: a regulation aimed at one market affects others (rent control affecting supply, mobility, urban form); the Externality is the side-effect pattern with a price-system framing.
This sourceEmpirical demonstration that rent control aimed at protecting tenants produced off-target effects on housing supply and mobility.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
Documents that San Francisco rent control cut rental supply 15% and raised citywide rents; it does not use the externality or price-system framing.
“Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase.”
- Economic policy: a regulation aimed at one market affects others (rent control affecting supply, mobility, urban form); the Externality is the side-effect pattern with a price-system framing.
Domain-specific¶
- Government Failure
- A study of San Francisco's controls by Diamond, McQuade, and Qian found that protected tenants benefited but landlords' responses reduced the city's rental supply and pushed rents up elsewhere
This sourceFinds that San Francisco's rent-control expansion cut covered tenants' displacement while treated landlords reduced rental supply by 15 percent, likely raising market rents.
SupportedVerified against the source
- A study of San Francisco's controls by Diamond, McQuade, and Qian found that protected tenants benefited but landlords' responses reduced the city's rental supply and pushed rents up elsewhere
Verification¶
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