Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers

Vile, M. J. C. (1967). Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. Clarendon Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1967

Link

https://archive.org/details/constitutionalis0000vile

Cited from

law_governance, political_science

Cited by

2 citations across 2 artifacts.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Checks and Balances
  • Checks and balances often conflate two distinct goals, a distinction Vile (1967) tracks across the development of constitutional doctrine: functional separation (legislative authority over law-making, executive authority over enforcement) and power distribution (ensuring no actor becomes predominant).

    This sourceIntellectual-historical treatment tracing the doctrine from antiquity through Locke, Montesquieu, and the U.S. founding; argues that pure separation, mixed government, and checks-and-balances are analytically distinct doctrines (distinct personnel, functions, and procedures) whose conflation has obscured the institutional core.

• Separation of Powers
  • Each branch has distinct personnel, staffing models, incentive structures, and decision-making timescales, a feature Vile (1967) treats as the empirical core of the doctrine in his historical analysis of constitutionalism and the separation of powers.

    This sourceModern intellectual-historical treatment tracing the doctrine from antiquity through Locke, Montesquieu, and the U.S. founding; argues that pure separation, mixed government, and checks-and-balances are analytically distinct doctrines whose conflation has obscured the institutional core—distinct personnel, functions, and procedures across branches.

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