Information Design in Bayesian Routing Games¶
Cianfanelli, L., Ambrogio, A., & Como, G. (2023). Information Design in Bayesian Routing Games. 2023 62nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 3945-3949.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Mechanisms¶
- Incentive-Compatible Routing Guidance
- Its strength is that it improves the equilibrium without prices or restrictions, so it works in settings where you can't charge agents and can't compel them — the guidance is adopted voluntarily precisely because it's built to satisfy each agent's own objective.
This sourceDesigns private route recommendations that satisfy obedience constraints, so travelers have no incentive to deviate and can voluntarily implement a lower-cost equilibrium without tolls or compulsory routing.
- Its strength is that it improves the equilibrium without prices or restrictions, so it works in settings where you can't charge agents and can't compel them — the guidance is adopted voluntarily precisely because it's built to satisfy each agent's own objective.
Verification¶
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Does it back the claim? Not recorded. The single citation of this work carries no recorded support check.
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Registry ID ref:5839e5c10483 · see in the full table