Games and Decisions¶
Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley.
Cited by¶
5 citations across 5 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Nash Equilibrium
- These can diverge dramatically: a classic two-agent dilemma has its unique Nash equilibrium at the Pareto-dominated outcome, so rational individual choice produces a collectively bad result.
This sourceStandard reference presenting the prisoner's dilemma, dominant strategies, and the divergence between the Nash equilibrium and Pareto-efficient outcomes.
- These can diverge dramatically: a classic two-agent dilemma has its unique Nash equilibrium at the Pareto-dominated outcome, so rational individual choice produces a collectively bad result.
- Non-Zero-Sum Game
- Two players each choose Cooperate or Defect, with payoffs \((R, R)\) for mutual cooperation, \((P, P)\) for mutual defection, and \((T, S)\) / \((S, T)\) for the asymmetric outcomes, ordered \(T > R > P > S\).
This sourceStandard reference presenting the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff structure (T>R>P>S), its nontrivial Pareto frontier, and the gap between the Pareto-optimal and Nash-equilibrium profiles.
- Two players each choose Cooperate or Defect, with payoffs \((R, R)\) for mutual cooperation, \((P, P)\) for mutual defection, and \((T, S)\) / \((S, T)\) for the asymmetric outcomes, ordered \(T > R > P > S\).
Domain-specific¶
- Battle of the Sexes
- The Battle of the Sexes is a canonical 2×2 game in which two players agree that coordinating on any single outcome is better than failing to coordinate, but each player prefers a different coordination outcome — one prefers joint choice A, the other prefers joint choice B. This structure yields exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (both choose A; both choose B), both of which Pareto-dominate miscoordination, but which distribute the surplus asymmetrically: the player whose favored outcome is selected gains more
This sourceLuce and Raiffa's own couple example - the man preferring the prize fight and the woman the ballet, both preferring to go together - the mixed-motive 2x2 that became the Battle of the Sexes. Establishes the game's third, mixed equilibrium and that its expected payoff is below the worse of the two pure equilibria for both players. Luce and Raiffa’s 1957 Games and Decisions couple example, in which the man prefers the fight, the woman the ballet, and each would rather be together than apart.
Supported in partVerified against a saved copy of the source
“stereotype, the man much prefers the fight and the woman the ballet; however, to both it is more important”
- The Battle of the Sexes is a canonical 2×2 game in which two players agree that coordinating on any single outcome is better than failing to coordinate, but each player prefers a different coordination outcome — one prefers joint choice A, the other prefers joint choice B. This structure yields exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (both choose A; both choose B), both of which Pareto-dominate miscoordination, but which distribute the surplus asymmetrically: the player whose favored outcome is selected gains more
- Dominated Strategy
- In the Prisoner's Dilemma, Defect strictly dominates Cooperate for each player — a one-round elimination leaves (Defect, Defect) as the unique surviving outcome
This sourceLuce and Raiffa’s presentation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with confess/not-confess alternatives, alongside their general treatment of deleting dominated strategies from a game.
Supported in partVerified against the work's full text
“right character for the prisoner’s [dilemma]. The problem for each [prisoner] is to decide whether to confess”
- In the Prisoner's Dilemma, Defect strictly dominates Cooperate for each player — a one-round elimination leaves (Defect, Defect) as the unique surviving outcome
Mechanisms¶
- Minimax Strategy Review
- Its failure mode is that minimax is congenitally pessimistic, so applied where the other side is not actually adversarial it leaves large mutual gains on the table — a permanent insurance premium paid against an enemy who isn't there.
This sourceCharacterizes maximin/minimax as a highly conservative, worst-case decision rule.
- Its failure mode is that minimax is congenitally pessimistic, so applied where the other side is not actually adversarial it leaves large mutual gains on the table — a permanent insurance premium paid against an enemy who isn't there.
Verification¶
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Links previously used in the corpus¶
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