Games and Decisions¶
Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. Wiley.
Cited by¶
2 citations across 2 artifacts.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Nash Equilibrium
- These can diverge dramatically: a classic two-agent dilemma has its unique Nash equilibrium at the Pareto-dominated outcome, so rational individual choice produces a collectively bad result.
This sourceStandard reference presenting the prisoner's dilemma, dominant strategies, and the divergence between the Nash equilibrium and Pareto-efficient outcomes.
- These can diverge dramatically: a classic two-agent dilemma has its unique Nash equilibrium at the Pareto-dominated outcome, so rational individual choice produces a collectively bad result.
- Non-Zero-Sum Game
- Two players each choose Cooperate or Defect, with payoffs \((R, R)\) for mutual cooperation, \((P, P)\) for mutual defection, and \((T, S)\) / \((S, T)\) for the asymmetric outcomes, ordered \(T > R > P > S\).
This sourceStandard reference presenting the Prisoner's Dilemma payoff structure (T>R>P>S), its nontrivial Pareto frontier, and the gap between the Pareto-optimal and Nash-equilibrium profiles.
- Two players each choose Cooperate or Defect, with payoffs \((R, R)\) for mutual cooperation, \((P, P)\) for mutual defection, and \((T, S)\) / \((S, T)\) for the asymmetric outcomes, ordered \(T > R > P > S\).
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