The Economics of Spam.¶
Rao, J. M., & Reiley, D. H. (2012). The Economics of Spam. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3), 87-110.
Cited by¶
1 citation across 1 artifact.
Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.
Primes¶
- Brandolini's Law
- Spam and content moderation — producing spam is automatable and near-zero-marginal-cost; filtering it requires continuously updated classifiers, human review, and infrastructure.
This sourceDocuments that sending spam has near-zero marginal cost (profitable at one purchase per ~3 million emails) while the externalized cost of filtering and lost attention runs ~100:1 against — the cheap-production/costly-correction asymmetry in spam and content moderation.
Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract
The abstract backs a ~100:1 spam external-cost-to-revenue asymmetry, but not the marginal-cost, automation or content-moderation clauses of the claim.
“Based on the work of crafty computer scientists who have infiltrated and monitored spammers' activity, we estimate that spammers and spam-advertised merchants collect gross worldwide revenues on the order of $200 million per year. Thus, the “externality ratio” of external costs to internal benefits for spam is around 100:1.”
- Spam and content moderation — producing spam is automatable and near-zero-marginal-cost; filtering it requires continuously updated classifiers, human review, and infrastructure.
Verification¶
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