Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse

Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2002). Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse. Princeton University Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

2002

Link

https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9780691016672verified

Cited from

information_theory

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Primes

• Winner's Curse
  • The winner's curse compresses a sprawling family of phenomena — auction overpayment, merger disappointment, post-hiring regression, procurement cost overruns, adverse selection in matching markets — into a single corrective rule: bid the conditional expectation of value given that you are the high estimator, not the unconditional expectation.

Verification

This reference passed the adversarial substantiation pipeline: it was checked to exist and to support the claim it is attached to. See how references were verified.

Registry ID ref:5aa8a8a9b61f · see in the full table