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Managerial Incentive Problems

Holmstrom, B. (1999). Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective. Review of Economic Studies, 169-182.

Type
Journal article
Intellectual base
Review or monograph
Year
1999
Pages
169-182
ISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/1467-937x.00083
DOI registrant
Oxford University Press
Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00083
Cited from
economics_finance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Primes

  • Signaling
    • T5: Pre-Contract Sorting vs Post-Contract Moral Hazard.

      Supported in partVerified against the publisher's abstract

      Holmström's model supplies the post-contract moral-hazard pole (career concerns make unobserved effort an implicit incentive) but is silent on pre-contract sorting and on the two being distinct problems.

      “An incentive problem arises from the person's ability and desire to influence the learning process, and therefore the wage process, by taking unobserved actions that affect today's performance.”

      From the publisher's abstract.

      Read by an automated reader; not a human review. How support was checked

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Registry ID ref:5ba8c36ab7f1 · see in the full table