Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence

Cukierman, A. (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. MIT Press.

Type

Book

Intellectual base

Review or monograph

Year

1992

Link

https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262514477/central-bank-strategy-credibility-and-independence/

Cited from

law_governance

Cited by

1 citation across 1 artifact.

Each citation links to the sentence it supports in the citing article.

Primes

• Editorial Independence
  • Central bank independence: appointment terms longer than the political cycle, operational independence on rate decisions, and statutory mandates not revisable by the executive.

    This sourceCodifies the dimensions of central-bank independence (appointment terms, operational autonomy, statutory mandate) and links them to policy credibility.

Verification

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Registry ID ref:5dd3d308a11c · see in the full table